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1Capacity Withholding in Restructured Wholesale
Power Markets: An Agent-Based Test Bed Study
Hongyan Li, Member, IEEE, and Leigh Tesfatsion, Member, IEEE
Abstract—This study uses a dynamic 5-bus test case imple-
mented via the AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed to
investigate strategic capacity withholding by generation compa-
nies (GenCos) in restructured wholesale power markets under
systematically varied demand conditions. The strategic behaviors
of the GenCos are simulated by means of a stochastic reinforce-
ment learning algorithm motivated by human-subject laboratory
experiments. The learning GenCos attempt to improve their
earnings over time by strategic selection of their reported supply
offers. This strategic selection can involve both physical capacity
withholding (reporting of lower-than-true maximum operating
capacity) and economic capacity withholding (reporting of higher-
than-true marginal costs). We explore the ability of demand
conditions to mitigate incentives for capacity withholding by
letting demand bids vary from 100% fixed demand to 100%
price-sensitive demand.
Index Terms—Capacity withholding, demand-bid price sensiti-
tivy, restructured wholesale power markets, locational marginal
pricing, multi-agent stochastic reinforcement learning, dynamic
5-bus test case, AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed
I. INTRODUCTION
THe U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)in an April 2003 white paper [1] proposed a market
design for common adoption by U.S. wholesale power mar-
kets. Core features of this market design include: central
management and oversight by an independent market operator;
a two-settlement system consisting of a bid/offer-based day-
ahead market supported by a parallel real-time market to
ensure continual balancing of supply and demand for power;
and management of transmission grid congestion by means of
locational marginal pricing.
Joskow [2] estimates that over 50% of generating capacity
in the U.S. is now operating under some variant of FERC’s
market design. Energy regions that have adopted (or plan
to adopt) this design include the midwest (MISO), New
England (ISO-NE), New York (NYISO), the mid-atlantic states
(PJM), California (CAISO), the southwest (SPP), and Texas
(ERCOT).
The complexity of FERC’s market design – together with
the relative recency of its adoption (implying short data series)
– makes it extremely difficult to study its dynamic performance
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properties using standard analytical and statistical modeling
tools. A key unresolved issue is the extent to which the
complicated rules and regulations governing market operations
under the design might encourage strategic bid/offer behaviors
on the part of market participants that reduce overall market
performance over time. A related issue is the extent to which
grid congestion and load-pocket formation can be strategically
manipulated to benefit certain market participants at the ex-
pense of others.
Fortunately, powerful new agent-based modeling tools are
now available that can handle this degree of complexity. As
detailed at [3], these tools are already fruitfully being applied
to the study of restructured wholesale power markets.
For example, in a series of studies ([4], [5], [6]) we
study economic capacity withholding (reporting of higher-
than-true marginal costs) by profit-seeking generation compa-
nies (GenCos) participating in a 5-bus wholesale power market
operating under FERC’s market design. The GenCos strate-
gically determine their supply offers over time using VRE
reinforcement learning, a variant of a stochastic reinforcement
learning algorithm developed by Alvin Roth and Ido Erev ([7],
[8]) on the basis of human-subject laboratory studies. These
economic capacity-withholding experiments were conducted
using the AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed, an open-
source computational laboratory specifically designed for the
systematic experimental study of FERC’s market design.1
Also, Tellidou and Bakirtzis [10] study physical capacity
withholding (reporting of lower-than-true maximum operating
capacity) as well as economic capacity withholding within
an agent-based computational modeling of an energy auction
market operating over a two-bus transmission grid with a fixed
daily demand (load) profile. Their simulated GenCos have
constant marginal costs and decide on hourly point quantity-
price supply offers via SA-Q learning, a modified version of
Q-learning. Each GenCo has the same learning parameters.
The authors find that the GenCos are able to learn over time
to exercise capacity withholding even if the only information
available to them is public price data.
In this study we extend this earlier work. We use the AMES
test bed to conduct systematic physical and economic capacity-
withholding experiments for a dynamic 5-bus test case under
alternative demand-bid price sensitivity conditions ranging
1AMES is an acronym for Agent-based Modeling of Electricity Systems.
The first version of AMES was formally released by the developers (H. Li,
J. Sun, and L. Tesfatsion) as open-source software at the 2007 IEEE Power
and Energy Society General Meeting. Downloads, manuals, and tutorial
information for all AMES version releases to date can be accessed at the
AMES homepage [9].
2from 100% fixed demand (no price sensitivity) to 100%
price sensitivity. GenCos and Load-Serving Entities (LSEs)
participate in a day-ahead energy market operating over a 5-
bus transmission grid with congestion managed by locational
marginal pricing. As in actual ISO-managed energy markets
such as the MISO [11], the supply offers of the GenCos
consist of reported marginal cost functions over reported
operating capacity intervals and the demand bids of the LSEs
are combinations of fixed demand bids and price-sensitive
demand bid functions. The GenCos rely on VRE reinforcement
learning to determine their reported supply offers over time.
Real-world restructured wholesale power markets are se-
quential open-ended games in that multiple participant traders
must decide on bids/offers for electric power on a daily basis,
with no fixed horizon. Presumably, then, the traders will
attempt to optimize their learning methods over time as they
gain market experience.
In recognition of this learning-to-learn issue, we take pre-
liminary steps in this study to help ensure that the GenCos’
learning methods are calibrated to their decision environment.
We conduct initial experiments for the dynamic 5-bus test
case with 100% fixed demand involving extensive parameter
sweeps for key VRE learning parameters. We use these initial
learning experiments to determine GenCo-individuated sweet
spot VRE learning parameter values resulting in the highest
daily net earnings for the GenCos. We then set each GenCo’s
VRE learning parameters to its sweet-spot values for all
subsequent experiments.
Section II outlines the main features of the AMES test
bed. Section III explains the experimental design used to
explore GenCo capacity withholding under systematically
varied settings for demand-bid price-sensitivity when Gen-
Cos have sweet-spot VRE learning capabilities. Section IV
explains more carefully how we determined these sweet-spot
VRE learning capabilities. Experimental findings for GenCo
capacity withholding are reported in Section V. Concluding
remarks are given in Section VI.
II. THE AMES TEST BED (VERSION 2.01)
A. Overview
This study uses Version 2.01 of the AMES Wholesale
Power Market Test Bed to conduct all reported experiments.
AMES(V2.01) incorporates core features of the wholesale
power market design proposed by the U.S. FERC [1]; see
Fig. 1. A detailed description of these features can be found
in materials provided at the AMES homepage [9].
Below is a summary description of the logical flow of events
in the AMES(V2.01) wholesale power market:
• The AMES wholesale power market operates over an
AC transmission grid starting on day 1 and continuing
through a user-specified maximum day (unless terminated
earlier in accordance with a user-specified stopping rule).
Each day D consists of 24 successive hours H = 00,01,
...,23.
• The AMES wholesale power market includes an Indepen-
dent System Operator (ISO) and a collection of energy
traders consisting of Load-Serving Entities (LSEs) and
Fig. 1. AMES test bed architecture
Fig. 2. AMES GenCo: A cognitive agent with learning capabilities
Generation Companies (GenCos) distributed across the
busses of the transmission grid. Each of these entities is
implemented as a software program encapsulating both
methods and data; see, e.g., the schematic depiction of a
GenCo in Fig. 2
• The objective of the ISO is the reliable attainment of
appropriately constrained operational efficiency for the
wholesale power market, i.e., the maximization of total
net benefits subject to generation and transmission con-
straints.
• In an attempt to attain this objective, the ISO undertakes
the daily operation of a day-ahead market settled by
means of locational marginal pricing (LMP) . Roughly
stated, a locational marginal price at any particular
transmission grid bus is the least cost of servicing demand
for one additional megawatt (MW) of power at that bus.2
• The objective of each LSE is to secure power for its
downstream (retail) customers. During the morning of
2In reality, LMPs are shadow prices for “nodal balance constraints”
constituting part of the constraint set of optimal power flow problems and are
derived as derivatives of the optimized power flow objective function with
respect to particular types of perturbations of these constraints. Moreover,
these nodal balance constraints are imposed at “pricing nodes” that might
not correspond to actual physical bus locations on the grid. For expositional
simplicity, throughout this study we use the standard engineering short-hand
description for LMPs as valuations for single-unit increases in demand and
we treat pricing nodes as coincident with transmission grid busses. For a more
rigorous explanation and derivation of LMPs, see [6].
3Fig. 3. AMES GenCos use stochastic reinforcement learning to determine
the supply offers they report to the ISO for the day-ahead market.
each day D, each LSE reports a demand bid to the ISO
for the day-ahead market for day D+1. Each demand bid
consists of two parts: a fixed demand bid (i.e., a 24-hour
load profile); and 24 price-sensitive demand bids (one for
each hour), each consisting of a linear demand function
defined over a purchase capacity interval. LSEs have no
learning capabilities; LSE demand bids are user-specified
at the beginning of each simulation run.
• The objective of each GenCo is to secure for itself
the highest possible net earnings each day. During the
morning of each day D, each GenCo i uses its current
action choice probabilities to choose a supply offer from
its action domain ADi to report to the ISO for use in all
24 hours of the day-ahead market for day D+1.
• Each supply offer in ADi consists of a linear marginal
cost function defined over an operating capacity interval.
GenCo i’s ability to vary its choice of a supply offer
from its action domain ADi permits it to adjust the or-
dinate/slope of its reported marginal cost function and/or
the upper limit of its reported operating capacity interval
in an attempt to increase its daily net earnings.
• After receiving demand bids from LSEs and supply offers
from GenCos during the morning of day D, the ISO
determines and publicly reports hourly power supply
commitments and LMPs for the day-ahead market for
day D+1 as the solution to hourly bid/offer-based DC
optimal power flow (DC-OPF) problems. Transmission
grid congestion is managed by the inclusion of congestion
cost components in LMPs.
• At the end of each day D, the ISO settles all commitments
for the day-ahead market for day D+1 on the basis of the
LMPs for the day-ahead market for day D+1.
• At the end of each day D, each GenCo i uses stochastic
reinforcement learning to update the action choice proba-
bilities currently assigned to the supply offers in its action
domain ADi, taking into account its day-D settlement
payment (“reward”). In particular, as depicted in Fig. 3, if
the supply offer reported by GenCo i on day D results in a
relatively good reward, GenCo i increases the probability
of choosing this supply offer on day D+1, and conversely.
• There are no system disturbances (e.g., weather changes)
or shocks (e.g., forced generation outages or line out-
ages). Consequently, the binding financial contracts deter-
mined in the day-ahead market are carried out as planned
Fig. 4. AMES ISO activities during a typical day D
Fig. 5. Illustration of AMES dynamics on a typical day D in the absence
of system disturbances or shocks for the special case of a 5-bus grid
and traders have no need to engage in real-time (spot)
market trading.
• Each LSE and GenCo has an initial holding of money
that changes over time as it accumulates earnings and
losses.
• There is no entry of traders into, or exit of traders
from, the wholesale power market. LSEs and GenCos
are currently allowed to go into debt (negative money
holdings) without penalty or forced exit.
The activities of the ISO on a typical day D are depicted
in Fig. 4. The overall dynamical flow of activities in the
wholesale power market on a typical day D in the absence
of system disturbances or shocks is depicted in Fig. 5.
B. Demand Bids and Supply Offers
On each day D, each LSE j reports 24 demand bids for use
in the 24 hours of the day-ahead market for day D+1. The
demand bid for hour H consists of a fixed demand bid pFLj(H)
(in MWs) and a price-sensitive demand bid function
DjH(pSLj(H)) = cj(H) − 2dj(H) · pSLj(H) (1)
4defined over a true purchase capacity interval
0 ≤ pSLj(H) ≤ SLMaxj(H) , (2)
where pSLj(H) is real electric power (in MWs). The expression
DjH(pSLj(H)) denotes LSE j’s true purchase reservation value
for pSLj(H), i.e., the maximum dollar payment it is truly willing
to make (per MWh) for pSLj(H).
On each day D, each GenCo i’s true marginal cost function
for each hour H of the day-ahead market for day D+1 takes
the form of a linear function
MCi(pGi(H)) = ai + 2bi · pGi(H) (3)
defined over a true operating capacity interval
CapLi ≤ pGi(H) ≤ CapUi , (4)
where pGi(H) is real electric power (in MWs). The expression
MCi(pGi(H)) denotes GenCo i’s true sale reservation value
for pGi(H), i.e., the minimum dollar payment it is truly willing
to accept (per MWh) for pGi(H).
On each day D, each GenCo i submits one reported supply
offer to the ISO for use in each hour H of the day-ahead
market for day D+1. This reported supply offer consists of a
reported marginal cost function
MCRi (pGi) = a
R
i + 2b
R
i · pGi (5)
defined over a reported operating capacity interval
CapLi ≤ pGi ≤ CapRUi , (6)
where pGi is real electric power (in MWs). The expression
MCRi (pGi) denotes GenCo i’s reported sale reservation value
for pGi, i.e., the minimum dollar payment it reports it is
willing to accept (per MWh) for pGi.
To avoid operating at a point where the true marginal
cost of its last supplied MW of power exceeds the marginal
benefit (received payment), GenCo i’s reported marginal cost
functions (5) lie on or above its true marginal cost function
(3). In addition, to avoid infeasible commitments, GenCo i’s
reported maximum operating capacity CapRUi in (6) never
exceeds its true maximum operating capacity CapUi in (4).
Note from the above discussion that each reported supply
offer for GenCo i can be summarized in the form of a vector
(aRi ,bRi ,CapRUi ).
C. GenCo Costs and Net Earnings
Total variable cost refers to the costs sustained by a supplier
that vary with the level of its operations, whereas fixed cost
refers to the costs sustained by a supplier independently of its
level of operations. Total cost refers to the sum of the two.
For the specific context at hand, the true total variable cost
function for GenCo i for each hour H takes the form
TV Ci(pGi) =
∫ pGi
0
MCi(p)dp = ai·pGi+bi·[pGi]2 , (7)
and the true total cost function for GenCo i for each hour H
takes the form
TCi(pGi) = [TV Ci(pGi) + FCosti] , (8)
where pGi denotes any real-power generation level in (4). By
definition, then, the fixed cost for GenCo i in each hour H
takes the form TCi(0) = FCosti .
Net earnings are defined as revenues minus true total
variable cost. Suppose, in particular, that GenCo i is located
at bus k(i) and is committed at a generation level pGi at price
LMPk(i) for hour H of the day-ahead market for day D+1.
Then the the net earnings of GenCo i for hour H of day D+1
are given by
NEi(H,D) = LMPk(i) ∗ pGi − TV Ci(pGi) . (9)
The net earnings of GenCo i over all 24 hours of day D+1,
received in settlement from the ISO at the end of day D, are
then given by
NEi(D) =
H=23∑
H=00
NEi(H,D) . (10)
D. Determination of LMPs and Power Commitments
The AMES ISO computes hourly LMPs and power com-
mitments for the day-ahead market by solving bid/offer-based
DC Optimal Power Flow (OPF) problems that approximate
underlying AC-OPF problems. To handle these computations
the AMES ISO makes repeated calls to DCOPFJ, an accurate
and efficient Java DC-OPF solver developed as open-source
software by Sun and Tesfatsion ([5], [6]).3 DCOPFJ consists
of a strictly convex quadratic programming solver wrapped in
an outer SI-pu data conversion shell.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
All market performance experiments reported in this study
are based on a dynamic 5-bus test case characterized by the
following structural, institutional, and behavioral conditions:
• The 5-bus transmission grid configuration is as depicted
in Fig. 6, with transmission grid, LSE, and GenCo
structural attributes as presented in Li et al. [12].4
• The five GenCos in Fig. 6 are individual plant owners
with distinct maximum operating capacities as follows:
110MW for GenCo 1 (G1); 100MW for GenCo 2 (G2);
520MW for GenCo 3 (G3); 200MW for GenCo 4 (G4);
and 600 MW for GenCo 5 (G5). Note that the next-to-
largest GenCo 3 is favorably situated in a potential “load
pocket” with respect to the three LSEs.
• GenCo 4 (a “peaking unit” ) has the most costly gen-
eration. Next in line is GenCo 3. The three remaining
GenCos 1, 2, and 5 have moderate costs.
• The daily fixed demand (load) profiles for the three LSEs
are the same from one day to the next. As depicted in
Fig. 7, each daily fixed demand profile peaks at hour 17.5
3A stand-alone version of DCOPFJ can be obtained at the software site for
the IEEE Taskforce on Open-Source Software for Power Systems [13].
4The 5-bus transmission grid depicted in Fig. 6 is due to Lally [14]. This
grid configuration is now used extensively in ISO-NE/PJM training manuals
to derive quantity and price solutions at a given point in time assuming ISOs
have complete and correct information about grid, LSE, and GenCo structural
attributes.
5These profile shapes are adopted from a case study presented in Shahideh-
pour et al. [15, p. 296-297].
5Fig. 6. 5-bus transmission grid for the dynamic 5-bus test case
Fig. 7. Daily LSE fixed demand (load) profiles for the dynamic 5-bus test
case
• The VRE learning parameters for each of the five GenCos
are set at “sweet spot” values for which the GenCos as
a whole earn the highest average daily net earnings.6
To control for purely random effects, we conducted thirty
runs for each treatment using thirty distinct random seed
values; see Li et al. [12] for the precise numerical values used.
Also, unless otherwise indicated, experiments were conducted
with all five AMES stopping rules flagged “on.” The stopping
day for each run is referred to as the final day for that run.
Our primary treatment factor is the extent to which each
GenCo can exercise physical capacity withholding by re-
porting lower-than-true maximum operating capacities. As
clarified more carefully in Section V, we investigate two
shrinkage rates for reported maximum operating capacities:
5% shrinkage (relative to true maximum operating capacity);
and 10% shrinkage (relative to true maximum operating ca-
pacity).
Another treatment factor we consider is relative demand-bid
price sensitivity. As our measure for this factor, we construct
a ratio R of maximum potential price-sensitive demand to
maximum potential total demand. More precisely, for each
LSE j and each hour H, let
Rj(H) =
SLMaxj(H)
MPTDj(H)
. (11)
In (11) the expression SLMaxj(H) denotes LSE j’s maximum
potential price-sensitive demand in hour H as measured by
6In particular, as explained in the following Section IV, we use Case(1,1)
in Table I corresponding to the basic learning parameter settings α = 1 and
β = 100.
Fig. 8. Illustration of the construction of the R ratio for measuring relative
demand-bid price sensitivity for the special case R=0.5
the upper bound of its purchase capacity interval (2), and
MPTDj(H) = [pFLj(H) + SLMaxj(H)] (12)
denotes LSE j’s maximum potential total demand in hour
H as the sum of its fixed demand pFLj(H) and its maximum
potential price-sensitive demand SLMaxj(H) in hour H. The
construction of the R ratio is illustrated in Fig. 8.
For our price-sensitive demand experiments we start by
setting all of the R values (11) for each LSE j and each
hour H equal to R=0.0 (the pure fixed-demand case). We then
systematically increase R by tenths, ending with the value
R=1.0 (the pure price-sensitive demand case). A positive R
value indicates that the LSEs are able to exercise at least some
degree of price resistance.
The maximum potential price-sensitive hourly demands
SLMaxj(H) for each LSE j are thus systematically increased
across experiments. However, we control for confounding
effects arising from changes in overall demand capacity as
follows: For each LSE j and each hour H, the denominator
value MPTDj(H) in (12) is held constant across experiments
by appropriate reductions in the fixed demand pFLj(H) as
SLMaxj(H) is increased. Specifically, MPTDj(H) is set equal
across all experiments to BPFLj(H), the hour-H fixed-demand
level BPF (H) for LSE j specified in Li et al. [12] for their
benchmark dynamic 5-bus test case. Consequently, for each
tested R value,
pFLj(H) = [1-R] ∗BPFLj(H) ; (13)
SLMaxj(H) = R ∗ BPFLj(H). (14)
Moreover, as R is incrementally increased from R=0.0
to R=1.0, we control for confounding effects arising from
changes in the LSEs’ price-sensitive demand bids by setting
the ordinate and slope parameters {(cj(H),dj(H)): H=00,...,23}
to fixed values for each LSE j. A listing of the specific
numerical values used can be found in Li et al. [12].
IV. PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF SWEET-SPOT
VRE LEARNING PARAMETER VALUES
This section reports on initial learning experiments con-
ducted with the dynamic 5-bus test case outlined in Section III
with 100% fixed demand and no physical capacity withhold-
ing. The purpose of these initial learning experiments is to
determine “sweet-spot” VRE learning parameter values for
6the GenCos that perform reasonably well for their particular
decision environment.
Reasonability is judged in terms of the average daily net
earnings (Avg DNE) ultimately attained by the GenCos as a
result of the supply offers (actions) they learn to report to the
ISO over time. Avg DNE is calculated as the daily net earnings
(10) earned on the final day D averaged across all five GenCos
and across all thirty runs.
As detailed in Appendix A, the VRE reinforcement learning
algorithm for each GenCo i is characterized by the following
four parameters:
• GenCo i’s initial action choice propensity level qi(1),
which determines GenCo i’s initial aspiration level for
daily net earnings at the beginning of day 1;
• GenCo i’s temperature cooling rate Ti, which controls
the extent to which differences in GenCo i’s action choice
propensities translate into differences in GenCo i’s action
choice probabilities;
• GenCo i’s recency parameter ri, which controls the
relative weight GenCo i places on current versus past
“rewards” (daily net earnings outcomes) when it updates
its action choice propensity values;
• GenCo i’s experimentation parameter ei, which dampens
the growth of GenCo i’s chosen-action propensity levels
and controls the extent to which a reward resulting from
a currently chosen action affects GenCo i’s updating of
its action choice propensities for non-chosen actions.
In extensive VRE learning experiments conducted for the
benchmark dynamic 5-bus test case under alternative settings
for the recency and experimentation parameters r and e over
their full feasible ranges from 0 to 1, Pentapalli [16] de-
termined that high Avg DNE outcomes were generally ob-
tained with r=0.04 and e=0.96 for each GenCo. Consequently,
throughout the present study we set r=0.04 and e=0.96 for
each GenCo i.
Clearly the values set for the initial action choice propensity
level qi(1) and temperature cooling rate Ti for each GenCo
i should reasonably be calibrated to the particular earnings
opportunities it faces. The following normalization is used to
achieve this individual calibration while minimizing the total
number of parameter values to be experimentally determined.
We first define a derived parameter
α =
qi(1)
MaxDNEi
, i = 1, . . . , I , (15)
where MaxDNEi is an estimate for GenCo i’s maximum
possible daily net earnings derived from its action domain
ADi assuming “competitive” marginal-cost pricing (sales
price = reported marginal cost). Specifically, letting sRi =
(aRi ,bRi ,CapRUi ) denote a generic supply offer in ADi,7
MaxDNEi = 24 ∗
(
max
sRi ∈ADi
[
HNE(sRi )
])
, (16)
7Compare (16) with definition (10) for the actual net earnings of GenCo i
over all 24 hours of the day-ahead market for day D+1 under LMP pricing.
The LMP received by GenCo i at a positive generation commitment level pGi
in any hour H can exceed GenCo i’s reported marginal cost at pGi for hour
H if GenCo i has a binding upper operating capacity limit at pGi. This is
why MaxDNEi is characterized as an estimate rather than a true upper bound
for GenCo i’s maximum possible daily net earnings.
Fig. 9. A heat-map depiction of average daily net earnings (Avg DNE)
outcomes under alternative (α,β) VRE learning parameter combinations.
Lighter shades indicate higher Avg DNE.
where the hourly net earnings function HNE(sRi ) satisfies
HNE(sRi ) = MC
R
i (Cap
RU
i ) ∗CapRUi − TV Ci(CapRUi ) .
(17)
Given a (typically) distinct positive value MaxDNEi for each
GenCo i, a non-negative setting for α determines a distinct
initial earnings aspiration level qi(1) for each GenCo i. Low
α values correspond to pessimistic aspiration levels (relative
to MaxDNEi), and conversely.
We then define a second derived parameter
β =
qi(1)
Ti
, i = 1, . . . , I . (18)
Given a non-negative value for α in (15) – and hence a value
for qi(1) for each GenCo i – a non-negative setting for β in
(18) determines a temperature cooling rate Ti for each GenCo
i. Low β values correspond to high temperature cooling rates,
and conversely.
Table I reports experimental findings for Avg DNE under
alternative values for α and β. Fig. 9 provides a heat-map
depiction of these Avg DNE findings.
An interesting “sweet spot” pattern is immediately evident
in Fig. 9: namely, the (α,β) combinations associated with
the highest Avg DNE outcomes are along a nonlinear ridge
line spanning combinations from (high,high)=(1,100) in the
northwest corner to (low,moderate)=(1/24,2) in the south-
central region. What causes this nonlinear coupled dependence
of Avg DNE on α and β?
A high α value reflecting an optimistically high initial
earnings aspiration tends to induce experimentation with alter-
native action choices due to “disappointment” with the actual
net earnings outcomes resulting from early action choices
(reflected in large drops in propensity values for these chosen
actions). Experimentation can facilitate the eventual discovery
of good actions. Conversely, a low α value reflecting a
pessimistically low initial earnings aspiration tends to induce
premature fixation on an early action choice due to the
unexpectedly high earnings outcome resulting from this choice
(refelected in a large increase in the propensity value for this
chosen action).
Nevertheless, these α effects can be amplified or offset
by β effects. A high β value (low T value) amplifies the
7tendency to premature fixation by amplifying differences in
propensity levels across action choices. A moderately low
β value can prevent premature fixation by dampening the
effects of propensity changes on action choice probabilities.
However, a sufficiently low β value results in action choice
probability distributions that are essentially uniform across the
GenCo’s action domain, negating all of the GenCo’s efforts
to learn which actions result in highest daily net earnings.
This deleterious effect is seen in the uniformly low Avg DNE
outcomes achieved in Table I and Fig. 9 for the lowest tested
β levels 1 and 1/2.
Based on the Avg DNE findings presented in Table I and
depicted in Fig. 9, we use the sweet-spot VRE learning
parameter settings (α, β) = (1,100) in all of the capacity-
withholding experiments reported in Section V.8
V. REPORT OF KEY FINDINGS
FOR CAPACITY WITHHOLDING
A. Benchmark Case: No Physical Capacity Withholding
This subsection presents findings for dynamic 5-bus test
case experiments in which the GenCos can exercise economic
capacity withholding but not physical capacity withholding.
That is, the GenCos can learn over time to report higher-than-
true marginal cost functions, but each GenCo i always reports
a maximum operating capacity equal to its true maximum
operating capacity CapUi .9
Table II reports Avg DNE outcomes for each GenCo i, as
well as overall Avg DNE, calculated for day D=100. Results
are reported for R values ranging from R=0.0 (100% fixed
demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand).
Consider, first, the results for R=0.0. Not surprisingly,
GenCo 3 attains the highest Avg DNE. As seen from Fig. 6,
GenCo 3 is located within a potential “load pocket”. Indeed,
the branch connecting Bus 1 to Bus 2 is typically congested
around the peak demand hour 17, and GenCo 3 exploits the
resulting load-pocket opportunity by engaging in substantial
economic capacity withholding.
GenCo 5 has the largest operating capacity and it is commit-
ted at a higher power output each day, on average, than GenCo
3. However, it does not end up with as high a mark-up over
true marginal cost as GenCo 3 and hence attains a lower Avg
DNE. GenCo 4 is committed at about half of its operating
capacity at a moderate mark-up over true marginal cost, on
average, and the Avg DNE of GenCo 4 is approximately the
same as for GenCo 5.
8For completeness and replicability purposes, we also note here that the
following parameter settings for action domain construction were used in
the Section V experiments for each GenCo i: M1i=10; M2i=10; M3i=1
(experiments with no physical capacity withholding); M3i=10 (experiments
with physical capacity withholding); RIMinCi = 1 (experiments with no
physical capacity witholding); RIMinCi =0.95 (experiments with a maximum
of 5% physical capacity withholding permitted); and RIMinCi =0.90 (exper-
iments with a maximum of 10% physical capacity withholding permitted).
The cardinality of the action domain for each GenCo i is determined as the
product Mi of M1i, M2i, and M3i. See Sun and Tesfatsion [5] for a detailed
description of action domain construction for the AMES GenCos.
9More precisely, each GenCo i’s action domain ADi consists of 100
possible supply offers. Each possible supply offer is a “marginal cost” function
that lies on or above GenCo i’s true marginal cost function and that spans
GenCo i’s true operating capacity interval [CapL,CapU ].
Finally, the two smallest-capacity GenCos 1 and 2 are both
located at Bus 1, hence they are in direct rivalry with each
other. Moreover, the branch connecting Bus 1 to Bus 2 exhibits
persistent congestion around the peak demand hour 17, hence
GenCos 1 and 2 are partially blocked from servicing the
demand at Busses 2, 3, and 4 during this peak demand time.
Consequently, GenCos 1 and 2 are committed at relatively low
power outputs at relatively low mark-ups over true marginal
cost, on average, and both attain relatively low Avg DNEs.
Table II also shows that the individual Avg DNEi for each
GenCo i dramatically declines as R increases from 0.0 to
1.0. However, these declines are at different rates for different
GenCos, resulting in changes in their shares in overall Avg
DNE.
For example, given R=0.0 (100% fixed demand), GenCo
5’s share of Avg DNE is smaller than that of GenCo 3 despite
having the largest operating capacity of all GenCos. However,
given R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand), GenCo 5 has the
highest share of Avg DNE of all GenCos; it is now being
committed at the highest power level, and this outweighs
the fact that GenCo 5 is exercising less economic capacity
withholding than GenCo 3.
The underlying reason for these relative changes in fortune
is that total demand substantially declines in moving from
R=0.0 to R=1.0. All GenCos are forced to compete with each
other for the reduced demand. Eventually, all GenCos lose
their pivotal supplier status, and any GenCo aggressively en-
gaging in economic capacity withholding risks being undercut
by rival supply offers. In particular, GenCos with relatively
low true marginal costs are more favored in this environment
since higher-cost GenCos could fail to be committed at all.
B. Common Maximum Physical Capacity Withholding Rates
This subsection presents findings for dynamic 5-bus test
case experiments in which the GenCos can exercise physical
capacity withholding as well as economic capacity withhold-
ing. More precisely, the GenCos can report supply offers
for which their reported maximum operating capacities are
strictly less than their true maximum operating capacities by
a percentage no greater than a maximum shrinkage rate, either
5% or 10%.10
Table III reports GenCo average % capacity shrinkages
and % Avg DNE changes (relative to the benchmark case of
no physical capacity withholding) calculated for day D=100
when the maximum shrinkage rate is 5%. Results are reported
under systematically varied demand conditions ranging from
R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive
demand). The results in Table III display several regularities,
as follows:
• For each R value, each GenCo’s average % capacity
shrinkage is well below the maximum shrinkage rate.
10More precisely, each GenCo i’s action domain ADi consists of 1000
possible supply offers. GenCo i can choose from among 10 equally-spaced
shrinkage rates s from 0% to the maximum shrinkage rate. Each shrinkage
rate s has the form s = 100%·[CapU - CapRU (s)]/[CapU - CapL], which
determines a reported maximum operating capacity CapRU (s). For each
shrinkage rate s there are 100 possible supply offers, each consisting of a
“marginal cost” function that lies on or above GenCo i’s true marginal cost
function and that spans the operating capacity interval [CapL,CapRU (s)].
8• For each R value, the five GenCos have similar average
% capacity shrinkages.
• For each R value, the % Avg DNE change is positive
for some GenCos and negative for others (relative to
benchmark).
The latter net earnings finding reflects how extraordinarily
difficult it is for individual GenCos operating in dynamic
wholesale power markets with multiple rivals to ensure that
strategic changes in their reported supply offers indeed result
in higher average daily net earnings for themselves.
For example, for R=0.0, GenCo 1, GenCo 2, and GenCo 5
attain higher average daily net earnings (relative to benchmark)
while GenCo 3 and GenCo 4 substantially lose ground.
Examining the micro data, it is seen that GenCo 1, GenCo 2,
and GenCo 5 are being committed on average at somewhat
higher power levels (relative to benchmark) while, at the
same time, the LMPs at their busses are higher as well
(relative to benchmark). In contrast, GenCo 3 and GenCo 4
are being committed on average at somewhat smaller power
levels (relative to benchmark) and the LMPs at their busses
are much lower (relative to benchmark).
LMPs and power commitments are, of course, system out-
comes determined by the totality of demand bids and supply
offers reported into the day-ahead market in interaction with
nonlinear power flow on the grid. They are not under the
control of individual GenCos, yet they determine the individual
daily net earnings of these GenCos.
The pattern of findings seen in Table III for a 5% maximum
shrinkage rate is also seen in Table IV, which repeats the
experiments of Table III for a 10% maximum shrinkage rate.
In addition, the following regularities are also evident:
• For each R value, each GenCo i’s average % capacity
shrinkage under a 10% maximum shrinkage rate is almost
twice its average % capacity shrinkage under a 5%
maximum shrinkage rate.
• Nevertheless, for each R value, each GenCo i’s % Avg
DNE change is very similar in sign and magnitude no
matter which maximum shrinkage rate is in effect.
Given the latter finding, in the next subsection focusing on
capacity withholding by a single GenCo we only report results
for the case of a 5% maximum shrinkage rate.
C. Physical Capacity Withholding by a Single GenCo
This subsection presents average % capacity shrinkages and
% Avg DNE changes (relative to the benchmark no-shrinkage
case) calculated for day D=100 in dynamic 5-bus test case
experiments in which only a single GenCo engages in capacity
shrinkage. The maximum shrinkage rate is fixed at 5%.
Specifically, in Table V the single Genco is the relatively
cheap and small GenCo 1. In Table VI the single GenCo is the
relatively more expensive and large GenCo 3. And in Table VII
the single Genco is the relative cheap yet largest GenCo 5.
Comparing the eighteen R/GenCo cases presented in these
three tables, the following intriguing regularities are seen:
• For the set of cases corresponding to any one R value,
all of the GenCos engaging in capacity shrinkage have
similar average % capacity shrinkages well below the
maximum permitted shrinkage rate of 5%; yet their %
Avg DNE changes (relative to benchmark) are highly
dissimilar.
• For many cases, the single GenCo engaging in capacity
shrinkage has a negative % Avg DNE change (relative to
benchmark). This is particularly true for cases involving
GenCo 1 and GenCo 5.
• For almost all cases, at least one GenCo not engaging
in capacity shrinkage has a positive % Avg DNE change
(relative to benchmark). This is particularly true when
GenCo 1 engages in capacity shrinkage.
• For no case is it true either that all GenCos end up having
a positive % Avg DNE change (relative to benchmark) or
that all GenCos end up having a negative % Avg DNE
change (relative to benchmark).
A clear understanding of these results must await a more
extensive examination of outcomes at a micro level. Yet one
implication seems clear. Capacity withholding has interesting
cross-effects that could potentially be exploited by GenCos
who own multiple generation plants located at multiple busses.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Restructured wholesale power markets are sequential open-
ended games. A careful explanation of the findings presented
in Section V will thus require a detailed micro examination of
learning behaviors and market interactions over time.
For example, maximum potential total demand (12) in our
dynamic 5-bus test case experiments is always less than 90%
of the true total operating capacity of the five GenCos. Even
during peak demand times when congestion partially blocks
relatively cheap generation at Bus 1 from servicing demand at
Busses 2, 3, and 4 there is always enough potential operating
capacity to satisfy demand. Consequently, it would seem that
strategic capacity withholding to induce higher net earnings
should not be a serious problem.
What is missing from this high-level analysis, however,
is a determination of the pivotal supplier status of different
GenCos with regard to fixed demand, meaning that fixed
demand cannot be met without their operating capacity. Pivotal
supplier status relative to fixed demand implies substantial op-
portunities for the exercise of market power through capacity
withholding. An additional complicating aspect is that capacity
withholding on the part of some GenCos can induce pivotal
supplier status (and higher net earnings) for others.
This issue will be addressed in future studies.
APPENDIX A
VRE REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
This section describes the implementation of the VRE rein-
forcement learning algorithm for an arbitrary AMES(V2.01)
GenCo i.
Suppose it is the beginning of the initial day D=1. Each
GenCo i must choose an action (supply offer) from its action
domain ADi to report to the ISO for the day-ahead market in
day D+1, where ADi consists of Mi possible actions.
The initial propensity of GenCo i to choose action m ∈
ADi is given by qim(1) for m = 1,...,Mi . AMES(V2.01)
9permits the user to set these initial propensity levels to any
real numbers. However, the assumption used in this study is
that GenCo i’s initial propensity levels are all set equal to
some common value qi(1), as follows:
qim(1) = qi(1) for all supply offers m ∈ ADi (19)
Now consider the beginning of any day D ≥ 1, and suppose
the current propensity of GenCo i to choose action m in ADi
is given by qim(D). The choice probabilities that GenCo i uses
to select an action for day D are then constructed from these
propensities as follows:
pim(D) =
exp(qim(D)/Ti)∑Mi
j=1 exp(qij(D)/Ti)
, m ∈ ADi (20)
In (20), Ti is a temperature cooling rate that affects the
degree to which GenCo i makes use of propensity values in
determining its choice probabilities. As Ti →∞, then pim(D)
→ 1/Mi, so that in the limit GenCo i pays no attention to
propensity values in forming its choice probabilities. On the
other hand, as Ti → 0, the choice probabilities (20) become
increasingly peaked over the particular actions m having
the highest propensity values qim(D), thereby increasing the
probability that these actions will be chosen.
At the end of day D, the current propensity qim(D) that
GenCo i associates with each action m in ADi is updated in
accordance with the following rule. Let m′ denote the action
that was actually selected and reported into the day-ahead
market by GenCo i in day D. Also, let NEim′ (D) denote the
actual daily net earnings (10) attained by GenCo i at the end
of day D as its settlement payment for all 24 hours of the
day-ahead market for day D+1. Then, for each action m in
ADi,
qim(D+1) = [1−ri]qim(D) + Responseim(D) , (21)
where
Responseim(D) =
 [1− ei] ·NEim
′(D) if m = m′
ei · qim(D)/[Mi − 1] if m 6= m′,
(22)
and m 6= m′ implies Mi ≥ 2. The recency parameter ri
in (21) determines the relative weight placed on past versus
current daily net earnings payments in the updating of the
action choice propensities over time. The experimentation
parameter ei in (22) dampens the growth of the chosen
action’s propensity level. It also permits reinforcement to spill
over to some extent from a chosen action to other actions to
encourage continued experimentation with a wide variety of
actions in the early stages of the learning process.
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TABLE I
AVERAGE GENCO DAILY NET EARNINGS FOR THE FINAL DAY UNDER ALTERNATIVE GENCO VRE LEARNING PARAMETER SPECIFICATIONS (α,β)
WITH NO PRICE-SENSITIVE DEMAND AND NO PHYSICAL CAPACITY WITHHOLDING.
beta=100 beta=50 beta=10 beta=2 beta=1 beta=1/2
GenCo 1 69,219.61 5,578.19 19,786.27 19,825.24 19,825.24 19,863.80
GenCo 2 54,548.72 3,040.47 12,299.14 11,765.93 11,765.93 11,765.93
GenCo 3 1,725,216.72 1,765,140.21 529,014.82 548,883.32 548,883.32 547,658.35
alpha=1 GenCo 4 321,907.08 196,769.51 31,510.57 29,790.04 29,790.04 29,762.60
GenCo 5 270,754.58 187,954.06 190,968.98 189,378.40 189,378.40 189,396.96
Avg DNE 2,441,646.71 2,158,482.44 783,579.77 799,642.93 799,642.93 798,447.64
St. Dev. (558,896.97) (730,657.92) (399,309.98) (433,253.98) (433,253.98) (434,433.11)
GenCo 1 79,875.97 74,182.72 20,959.35 20,114.75 19,825.24 19,825.24
GenCo 2 64,817.10 61,235.66 14,366.78 12,241.57 11,765.93 11,765.93
GenCo 3 1,462,304.20 1,737,816.84 537,044.33 520,518.36 548,883.32 548,883.32
alpha=1/2 GenCo 4 306,198.90 337,814.49 32,397.27 29,790.04 29,790.04 29,790.04
GenCo 5 276,640.75 280,020.65 192,046.57 189,168.30 189,378.40 189,378.40
Avg DNE 2,189,836.92 2,491,070.36 796,814.29 771,833.01 799,642.93 799,642.93
St. Dev. (534,136.31) (496,068.85) (400,651.49) (400,321.80) (433,253.98) (433,253.98)
GenCo 1 87,629.74 79,100.46 14,920.20 20,187.91 20,114.75 19,825.24
GenCo 2 76,471.25 65,279.31 9,170.37 12,323.55 12,241.57 11,765.93
GenCo 3 1,115,033.21 1,328,446.25 1,074,869.72 525,030.40 520,518.36 548,883.32
alpha=1/4 GenCo 4 258,044.34 305,601.87 95,151.47 30,809.31 29,790.04 29,790.04
GenCo 5 256,589.11 270,324.35 188,384.38 190,457.78 189,168.30 189,378.40
Avg DNE 1,793,767.65 2,048,752.24 1,382,496.14 778,808.95 771,833.01 799,642.93
St. Dev. (529,846.55) (610,971.13) (920,990.49) (398,145.02) (400,321.80) (433,253.98)
GenCo 1 50,093.01 78,026.20 74,886.81 20,959.35 19,786.27 20,114.75
GenCo 2 47,977.10 69,290.98 60,364.79 14,366.78 12,299.14 12,241.57
GenCo 3 767,282.28 1,042,911.66 1,662,257.14 537,044.33 529,014.82 522,830.32
alpha=1/10 GenCo 4 153,075.18 225,113.47 318,609.44 32,397.27 31,510.57 29,790.04
GenCo 5 182,152.53 235,383.32 274,076.15 192,046.57 190,968.98 189,168.30
Avg DNE 1,200,580.10 1,650,725.62 2,390,194.34 796,814.29 783,579.77 774,144.97
St. Dev. (510,232.72) (665,255.14) (561,884.41) (400,651.49) (399,309.98) (398,842.95)
GenCo 1 37,197.65 53,395.14 79,422.74 9,329.03 22,190.32 20,787.98
GenCo 2 38,089.68 50,074.97 65,366.01 5,317.87 14,854.24 12,330.86
GenCo 3 635,691.68 682,930.40 1,178,427.61 1,615,272.93 549,196.62 528,895.76
alpha=1/24 GenCo 4 83,253.22 130,439.19 249,815.58 184,160.28 32,701.84 31,621.09
GenCo 5 183,685.63 193,689.29 248,395.06 193,984.82 192,528.20 192,354.51
Avg DNE 977,917.86 1,110,528.99 1,821,427.00 2,008,064.92 811,471.22 785,990.18
St. Dev. (403,198.74) (454,288.77) (549,146.76) (862,134.72) (399,997.12) (397,810.42)
TABLE II
BENCHMARK CASE: AVERAGE GENCO DAILY NET EARNINGS FOR DAY 100 WHEN ONLY ECONOMIC CAPACITY WITHHOLDING IS PERMITTED
GenCo R=0.0 R=0.2 R=0.4 R=0.6 R=0.8 R=1.0
1 20,196.11 25,023.98 18,747.53 15,805.06 10,531.84 4,854.98
2 16,366.03 21,665.28 15,385.46 13,475.27 11,314.75 5,324.56
3 1,237,976.82 176,717.76 51,536.59 17,695.26 7,630.61 3,398.80
4 165,133.57 11,746.23 2,523.19 534.78 135.97 66.88
5 188,646.36 179,072.71 147,584.54 114,626.37 81,038.34 54,220.06
Avg DNE 1,628,318.89 414,225.96 235,777.31 162,136.73 110,651.51 67,865.28
St. Dev. (878,152.41) (195,242.12) (116,151.45) (67,832.44) (30,366.66) (17,494.45)
TABLE III
CAPACITY SHRINKAGE CASE 1 (5% MAXIMUM): AVERAGE GENCO % CAPACITY SHRINKAGE AND % DAILY NET EARNINGS CHANGES
FOR DAY 100 RELATIVE TO THE BENCHMARK CASE
R=0.0 R=0.2 R=0.4 R=0.6 R=0.8 R=1.0
GenCo % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE
1 -0.023 0.124 -0.023 -0.109 -0.023 0.050 -0.024 -0.097 -0.025 -0.119 -0.026 -0.026(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
2 -0.017 0.333 -0.017 -0.021 -0.017 0.272 -0.017 0.140 -0.017 -0.059 -0.018 0.001(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
3 -0.022 -0.577 -0.021 0.033 -0.019 -0.006 -0.019 -0.043 -0.019 0.038 -0.019 0.012(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
4 -0.021 -0.784 -0.020 -0.073 -0.021 0.323 -0.020 0.092 -0.020 0.021 -0.020 0.022(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
5 -0.022 0.107 -0.021 0.035 -0.020 0.060 -0.020 0.002 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.028(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
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TABLE IV
CAPACITY SHRINKAGE CASE 2 (10% M AXIMUM): AVERAGE GENCO % CAPACITY SHRINKAGE AND % DAILY NET EARNINGS CHANGES
FOR DAY 100 RELATIVE TO THE BENCHMARK CASE
R=0.0 R=0.2 R=0.4 R=0.6 R=0.8 R=1.0
GenCo % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE
1 -0.046 0.124 -0.046 -0.101 -0.046 0.050 -0.049 -0.101 -0.050 -0.126 -0.052 -0.032(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
2 -0.034 0.327 -0.033 -0.015 -0.034 0.275 -0.034 0.137 -0.035 -0.066 -0.037 -0.002(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
3 -0.042 -0.566 -0.043 0.043 -0.038 0.007 -0.037 -0.019 -0.037 0.051 -0.037 0.021(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
4 -0.041 -0.778 -0.041 -0.038 -0.043 0.366 -0.040 0.142 -0.040 0.040 -0.040 0.043(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
5 -0.044 0.120 -0.042 0.081 -0.040 0.071 -0.041 0.007 -0.040 -0.017 -0.040 -0.026(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026)
TABLE V
CAPACITY SHRINKAGE CASE 3 (5% MAXIMUM, GENCO 1 ONLY): GENCO 1’S AVERAGE % CAPACITY SHRINKAGE AND ALL GENCOS’
AVERAGE % DAILY NET EARNINGS CHANGES FOR DAY 100 RELATIVE TO THE BENCHMARK CASE
R=0.0 R=0.2 R=0.4 R=0.6 R=0.8 R=1.0
GenCo % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE
1 -0.025 -0.061 -0.022 -0.093 -0.023 -0.100 -0.024 -0.072 -0.025 -0.097 -0.026 0.001(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
2 0.000 -0.012 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.014 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.007(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.003(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.006(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
5 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.011 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TABLE VI
CAPACITY SHRINKAGE CASE 4 (5% MAXIMUM, GENCO 3 ONLY): GENCO 3’S AVERAGE % CAPACITY SHRINKAGE AND ALL GENCOS’
AVERAGE % DAILY NET EARNINGS CHANGES FOR DAY 100 RELATIVE TO THE BENCHMARK CASE
R=0.0 R=0.2 R=0.4 R=0.6 R=0.8 R=1.0
GenCo % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE
1 0.000 0.181 0.000 -0.054 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2 0.000 0.181 0.000 -0.094 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3 -0.023 -0.573 -0.021 0.052 -0.019 0.004 -0.019 0.011 -0.019 0.013 -0.019 -0.003(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
4 0.000 -0.778 0.000 -0.063 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.008(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
5 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.014 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TABLE VII
CAPACITY SHRINKAGE CASE 5 (5% MAXIMUM, GENCO 5 ONLY): GENCO 5’S AVERAGE % CAPACITY SHRINKAGE AND ALL GENCOS’
AVERAGE % DAILY NET EARNINGS CHANGES FOR DAY 100 RELATIVE TO THE BENCHMARK CASE
R=0.0 R=0.2 R=0.4 R=0.6 R=0.8 R=1.0
GenCo % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE % ∆Cap % ∆NE
1 0.000 -0.103 0.000 -0.153 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.079 0.000 -0.004(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2 0.000 0.024 0.000 -0.169 0.000 0.106 0.000 -0.039 0.000 -0.060 0.000 0.062(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3 0.000 0.008 0.000 -0.015 0.000 -0.027 0.000 -0.022 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.009(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.457 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.006(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
5 -0.022 0.086 -0.021 -0.011 -0.021 0.047 -0.020 0.000 -0.020 -0.018 -0.020 -0.030(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
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